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SANFORD	  LEVINSON	  AND	  THE	  PROSPECTS	  	  
FOR	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  REFORM	  
Sotirios	  A.	  Barber	  *	  
SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNMENT   (2012). Pp. 448. Hardcover $29.95. 
 
Sanford Levinson’s recent book, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Cri-
sis of Government, strengthens his reputation as post New Deal America’s preeminent 
advocate of constitutional reform.1 Actually, that is putting it modestly. In his dust jacket 
testimonial for the book, Lawrence Lessig calls Levinson not a reformer, but a revolu-
tionary, indeed, “America’s greatest revolutionary constitutionalist.”2 It would be hard to 
dispute Lessig’s assessment, though Levinson himself might, for he hedges on whether 
revolution is what he seeks. “This book is a call, if not to revolution, [then] at least to ac-
tive citizenship,” says Levinson.3 Yet by active citizenship Levinson means active con-
cern not for private goods, but for a healthy democracy, which is a public good, born ap-
parently of a sense of obligation to “our loved ones,” to “our fellow members of the 
American political community,” and even to “persons around the world who inevitably 
pay costs for the dysfunctionalities of American government.”4 It would be hard to dis-
pute Lessig’s appraisal of Levinson because turning Americans toward active citizenship 
as Levinson conceives it would be revolutionary enough for anyone. 
Levinson’s appeal to his readers’ obligations to others should remind readers of 
another revolutionary at another time of constitutional dysfunction. I refer to the time 
when the Articles of Confederation had collapsed and Alexander Hamilton opened The 
Federalist with an appeal to the “patriotism” and the “philanthropy” of his readers and a 
summons to show the world that mankind was able to rise above “accident and force” 
and “establish[] good government from reflection and choice.”5 The most remarkable 
feature of Levinson’s most remarkable book is his effort to place himself and his readers 
in the positions of the founding fathers and the founding generation.6 This is not a book 
for litigators and judges, actors who take the stage after lawmakers have had their mo-
                                                	   *	   Professor	  of	  Political	  Science,	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   SANFORD	  LEVINSON,	  FRAMED:	  AMERICA’S	  51	  CONSTITUTIONS	  AND	  THE	  CRISIS	  OF	  GOVERNANCE	  (2012).	  	   2.	  	   Id.,	   reviewed	   by	   Lawrence	   Lessig,	   Editorial	   Reviews,	   AMAZON.COM,	  http://www.amazon.com/Framed-­‐Americas-­‐Constitutions-­‐Crisis-­‐Governance/dp/0199890757.	  	   3.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  391.	  	   4.	  	   	  See	  id.	  	   5.	   	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  1	  (Alexander	  Hamilton),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST	  	  3	  (Jacob	  E.	  Cooke	  ed.,	  1961).	  	  	   6.	  	   See	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  75-­‐76,	  342-­‐44,	  358,	  391-­‐92.	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ment; it is a book for would-be lawmakers, supreme-law makers. Unfortunately for eve-
ryone, too much has changed since the founding, and though lightning could strike, Lev-
inson’s ambitions for himself and the country seem altogether beyond the practical imag-
ination. 
Levinson thinks about governmental dysfunction in our day as the authors of The 
Federalist thought about it in their day: cultural forces play a part, but so does the na-
tion’s arrangement of offices and powers, and it is the latter upon which constitution 
makers and reformers should concentrate.7 Of the latter the most consequential for the 
quality of governmental action are not the contested standards usually couched in consti-
tutional rights (like “equal protection” and “due process”) but the normally uncontrover-
sial structural provisions by which the public recognizes the principal offices and officers 
of governmentand their functions and relationships. Examples of the latter would be 
rules defining the composition, functions, and procedures of the Electoral College, the 
houses of Congress, and the presidency. Levinson sees the contestable standards of the 
Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments as belonging to the “Constitution of Con-
versation” and the less controversial structural norms as making up the “Constitution of 
Settlement.”8 He concentrates on the latter, the Constitution’s “hard-wired structures,” 
because he thinks they are chiefly responsible for the current governmental dysfunction.9 
This focus on the Constitution’s normally uncontroversial provisions pushes problems of 
constitutional meaning to the background, and Levinson’s chief concern in Framed is not 
what the Constitution means, but whether it works—whether it establishes a government 
that “fulfills the ends to which a society imagines itself devoted.”10 “[T]hese ends are 
most likely to be set out in a preamble to [a] constitution, and that what follows the pre-
amble are best viewed simply as proposed means to those ends.”11 As means, the consti-
tutional provisions that frame a government “may be necessary,” but they can also be-
come “dangerous, if they remain unchanged” when “new circumstances” render them 
dysfunctional to the ends that justify their existence.12 In this essentially instrumental or 
ends-oriented understanding of the Constitution’s basic normative character, Levinson 
follows the authors of The Federalist.13 
Levinson is like the framers in yet another way. He knows that Americans are not 
so exceptional that they can learn nothing from the experience of other nations. Indeed, it 
was the histories of “the petty Republics of Greece and Italy” and the American states 
under the Articles that led Hamilton and Madison to reject the public philosophy of the 
revolutionary period: the small republic and weak government tenets of classical republi-
canism.14 In the months preceding the convening of the Philadelphia convention in May 
                                                	   7.	  	   Id.	  at	  6-­‐7;	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  7	  (James	  Madison),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  57.	  	  	   8.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  27.	  	  	   9.	  	   Id.	   at	  17,	  19–25;	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  83	   (Alexander	  Hamilton),	   in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	   supra	  note	  5,	  at	  578-­‐79.	  	   10.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  8.	  	   11.	  	  	  Id.	  	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  8,	  55,	  115-­‐16,	  280,	  285,	  316,	  355-­‐57.	  	   13.	  	   See	   generally	   SOTIRIOS	   A.	   BARBER	   &	   JAMES	   E.	   FLEMING,	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   INTERPRETATION:	   THE	   BASIC	  QUESTIONS	  35–39	  (2007)	  (interpreting	  The	  Federalist	  in	  an	  ends-­‐oriented	  manner).	  	   14.	  	   The	  Federalist	  No.	  1	  (Alexander	  Hamilton),	   in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  5-­‐6;	  The	  Federalist	  
No.	   7	   (Alexander	  Hamilton),	   in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	   supra	  note	  5,	  at	  36-­‐43;	  The	  Federalist	  No.	   9	   (Alexander	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of 1787, Madison examined almost two hundred books on the constitutions of other na-
tions, ancient and modern, that Jefferson had sent from Paris. The results of Madison’s 
investigation are evident throughout The Federalist, especially in numbers eighteen 
through twenty.15 Levinson follows suit by examining the constitutions and constitution-
al experiences of at least twenty foreign nations and the fifty-one American states for 
clues as to what electoral and decisional structures might work better than America’s 
“broken” systems.16 Levinson’s basic strategy is to compare American institutions with 
those of other nations, seek the historical reasons behind the former, ask whether those 
reasons make sense today, survey alternative forms if old forms no longer work, and 
urge his fellow citizens to consider reform. 
An example of Levinson’s approach involves Congress’s impeachment power. 
Why, he asks, should we today be limited to impeaching a president for one or another 
species of “misconduct”?17 Should not “simple incompetence or bad judgment be 
enough” to remove a president, say, “through a vote of no confidence”?18 What discus-
sion of this matter occurred at the Philadelphia convention seemed concerned for pre-
serving presidential independence from overbearing legislatures of the kind that had fre-
quently swamped executive power in the states under the Articles.19 But, Levinson asks, 
why should we fear overbearing legislatures in our era of “imperial” and “plebiscitary” 
executives?20 In answering this question we might look at Germany, Israel, and other 
parliamentary states for various no-confidence devices. We might also examine the recall 
provisions of California, Wisconsin, and other American states. The value of executive 
accountability should impel us to this inquiry. The demanding criteria of the present im-
peachment process make chances for impeachment and conviction so miniscule that they 
remove fear of impeachment as a guarantor of presidential accountability.21 And election 
to a second and final term removes fear of the electorate as an instrument of presidential 
accountability.22 For accountability’s sake, therefore, we should either broaden the crite-
ria of impeachment, relax the process, or seek supplementary means, like removal by a 
no-confidence mechanism of some sort.23 
Another example is the Electoral College. Partly to avoid demagoguery and the 
tumult of unfiltered popular elections, but mostly to compensate for the public’s poor in-
formation on aught but local politicians in an age without organized national parties and 
national news media, the framers invented this unique institution.24 And so the “obvious 
                                                                                                                    Hamilton),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  51-­‐52;	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  15	  (Alexander	  Hamilton),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  91-­‐98;	  	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  10	  (James	  Madison),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  56-­‐57,	  62-­‐64;	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  15	  (James	  Madison),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  91-­‐98;	  see	  also	  HERBERT	  J.	  STORING,	  What	  the	  Anti-­‐Federalists	  Were	  For,	  in	  THE	  COMPLETE	  ANTI-­‐FEDERALIST	  1,	  15-­‐17	  (1981).	  	   15.	  	   See	  THE	  MIND	  OF	  THE	  FOUNDER:	  SOURCES	  OF	  THE	  POLITICAL	  THOUGHT	  OF	  JAMES	  MADISON	  69-­‐70	  (Marvin	  Meyers	  ed.,	  1973).	  	  	   16.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  29,	  153.	  	   17.	  	   Id.	  at	  214.	  	   18.	  	   Id.	  	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  214-­‐15.	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  215.	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  at	  217.	  	   22.	   Id.	  	  	   23.	   	  Id.	  at	  216-­‐18.	  	   24.	   Id.	  at	  178-­‐79.	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question,” made more pressing by the vast distance between the independent electors of 
character that the framers expected and the undistinguished party operatives who pres-
ently serve as electors, is why assume that ordinary Americans are less capable to choose 
a president than members of the Electoral College.25 This question having no compelling 
answer, Levinson proceeds to describe ways to mitigate the chances for electing candi-
dates who fail to win the popular vote.26 
Levinson accords similar treatment to every major constitutional structure, includ-
ing federalism, the practice of elections, the amending process, the executive veto, and 
bicameralism at both the national and state levels.27 He describes several of these institu-
tions (the apportionment of the Senate and the Electoral College) as partially the prod-
ucts of compromises at the founding that were either immoral (like slavery)28 or rational-
ly indefensible (like the notion of state autonomy associated with the dominant 
conception of American federalism).29 His treatment of these topics often rises to coura-
geous heights, as when he urges his readers to reopen Clinton Rossiter’s proposal for a 
“constitutional dictatorship” on the Roman model,30 and when he effectively calls upon 
his fellow citizens to bypass an unworkable amending process and “do whatever we can” 
to change unworkable structures.31 
One can doubt that Framed will have an impact on the thinking of the nation’s pol-
iticians, including the politicians who wear judicial robes; Levinson and the scholarly 
community generally have no way to persuade people who will not listen. With other re-
cent books of its genre,32 Framed could, and should, inspire a movement within the field 
of constitutional thought. The utter hopelessness of constitutional reform is but one ex-
pression of the country’s profound need for it, and it is long past time for constitutional 
scholarship to say so as a field, in the way that the field of biology argues for the theory 
of evolution over “creation science” and climatology warns of man-made global warm-
ing. The question for this essay is whether Levinson can lead such movement. It is not 
yet clear that he can. Though Levinson is our era’s leading apostle of constitutional re-
form, he may not appreciate the full implications of his position and the scope of the task 
ahead. 
As we have seen, Levinson is less interested in what the Constitution means than 
in whether the Constitution works, that is, whether government under the Constitution 
works to achieve social results that justify his personal fidelity to the Constitution (a 
question of his first book)33 and the nation’s fidelity to the Constitution (the question of 
                                                
	   25.	   Id.	  at	  181.	  	   26.	   Id.	  at	  179-­‐90.	  	   27.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	  	   28.	  	   Id.	  at	  36-­‐38,	  44,	  183-­‐84.	  	   29.	  	   Id.	  at	  291-­‐92,	  302-­‐03,	  308-­‐10,	  328-­‐29.	  	   30.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  370-­‐81.	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  	  358.	  	   32.	  	   See	   IS	   THE	   AMERICAN	   CONSTITUTION	   OBSOLETE?	   (Thomas	   E.	   Main	   ed.,	   2013);	   LAWRENCE	   LESSIG,	  REPUBLIC,	  LOST:	  HOW	  MONEY	  CORRUPTS	  CONGRESS—AND	  A	  PLAN	  TO	  STOP	  IT	  (2011);	  THOMAS	  E.	  MANN	  &	  NORMAN	  J.	  ORENSTEIN,	  IT’S	  EVEN	  WORSE	  THAN	  IT	  LOOKS:	  HOW	  THE	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  SYSTEM	  COLLIDED	  WITH	  THE	  NEW	  POLITICS	  OF	  EXTREMISM	  (2012);	  ALAN	  WOLFE,	  DOES	  AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  STILL	  WORK?	  (2007).	  	  	   33.	  	   SANFORD	  LEVINSON,	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  FAITH	  191-­‐94	  (1988).	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Framed).34 Whether the Constitution works depends on what the Constitution is sup-
posed to do. In Framed, Levinson seems to believe that the Constitution is meant to es-
tablish a government that makes reasonable progress toward constitutional ends (the 
common defense, the general welfare, etc.) in a way that can regularly secure the ap-
proval of the nation’s people. This position yields a two-part test of constitutional suc-
cess: a democratic test and a substantive test. Constitutional government must do the 
right thing and regularly secure popular approval for doing the right thing. Each part of 
this test marks a necessary condition for attributing success. Fail either part of the test, 
and constitutional government itself fails. Levinson’s second monograph (to which 
Framed is a sequel)35 found that the Constitution failed the democratic test, and one 
would have expected his third monograph to ask the substantive question: is constitu-
tional government in America, democratic or not, progressing toward a social state of 
affairs that reasonable people would find attractive? 
Levinson seems to know that constitutional theorists must eventually address this 
last question; they must elaborate and defend a substantive theory of constitutional ends. 
Such a theory would enable Levinson to conclude, for example, that the rise of the Reli-
gious Right, the continuing segregation of the public schools, the return of racially moti-
vated voter suppression, legalized bribery of elected politicians, the widening income 
gap and its negative consequences for upward mobility, and the failure to face the chal-
lenge of global warming all undermine essential constitutional commitments like equal 
opportunity and a secular public reasonableness. Though Levinson’s ends-oriented ap-
proach to the Constitution invites conclusions of this kind, inherited intellectual baggage 
holds him back. 
That Levinson recognizes the need for a substantive theory of constitutional ends is 
evident in his criticism of David Mayhew’s assessment of divided government.36 May-
hew and others argue that the volume of congressional output during periods of divided 
government (different parties occupying the presidency and at least one house of Con-
gress) undermines the widespread view that the multiple veto points of the American 
system make for dysfunctional government.37 Levinson responds that one cannot judge 
the government’s performance simply by comparing the number of laws passed under 
different party alignments; one must also assess the quality of those acts as compared to 
alternatives that Congress rejected or failed to consider.38 Levinson’s best example is the 
prescription drug benefit that President Bush pushed through Congress in 2004.39 Levin-
son refuses to count this measure as a success without first deciding whether it adequate-
ly addresses the needs of the elderly or “whether it [has] operated primarily as a gigantic 
                                                	   34.	  	   See	  generally	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   35.	  	   SANFORD	   LEVINSON,	   OUR	   UNDEMOCRATIC	   CONSTITUTION:	  WHERE	   THE	   CONSTITUTION	   GOES	  WRONG	   (AND	  HOW	  WE	  THE	  PEOPLE	  CAN	  CORRECT	  IT)	  25-­‐139	  (2006).	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  234-­‐36.	  	   37.	  	   DAVID	  MAYHEW,	   PARTIES	   AND	   POLICIES:	   HOW	   THE	   AMERICAN	   GOVERNMENT	  WORKS	   94-­‐136	   (2008);	   R.	  Shep	  Melnick,	  Does	  the	  Constitution	  Encourage	  Gridlock,	  in	  IS	  THE	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTION	  OBSOLETE?,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  135,	  139-­‐142.	  	   38.	  	   See	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  234-­‐35.	  	   39.	  	   Sanford	  Levinson,	  Thinking	  about	  Gridlock,	  in	  IS	  THE	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTION	  OBSOLETE?,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  121,	  124.	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corporate welfare program to politically well-connected ‘big pharma.’”40 Mere passage 
of the bill is a scientific question; chalk one up for Congress. Assessing the act is a value 
judgment “that doesn’t fit easily with the notion of value-free social science” that May-
hew represents.41 Levinson thus recognizes that talk of constitutional dysfunctional and 
reform cannot rationally occur within the value-free metaethics of mainstream social sci-
ence. 
Yet inconsistency with normative constitutional discourse is hardly enough to sink 
a given metaethics, for normative discourse may proceed from a false assumption, the 
possibility of approachable moral truth. For Levinson’s enterprise to be intellectually 
meaningful, he should confront the central tenet of value-free social science, namely, that 
reason cannot decide between conflicting value judgments or that normative propositions 
lack truth value. Only if value judgments can be true in some objective sense can Levin-
son say that corporate welfare for “big pharma” at the expense of the elderly should not 
count as a legislative success. But Levinson seems unprepared to say that welfare for 
“big pharma” at the elders’ expense is wrong. He says instead, in standard value-free 
fashion, that whether legislation meets the nation’s needs “requires the application of 
one’s own political views.”42 Value free or value laden, this statement is wrong as a mat-
ter of standard logic. Standing alone, “one’s own political views” cannot be a reason for 
concluding that something is right or wrong. Consider two different propositions: (1) “I 
feel that shortchanging the elderly to benefit big pharma is wrong.” and (2) “Shortchang-
ing the elderly to benefit ‘big pharma’ is wrong.” The first proposition describes “one’s 
own political views” and, as such, invites no quarrel (except maybe from a psychiatrist 
who believes the speaker is repressing his true feelings). My personal political view 
would supply no basis for denying the fact that you disagreed. The second proposition, 
shortchanging the elderly is wrong, purports to describe not just my belief, but a fact in-
dependent of my belief; it claims, in effect, that something is wrong and would be wrong 
whether I agreed or not. The second proposition thus purports to describe a moral reality; 
and like all accounts of reality, it calls for evidence in its defense. 
By evidence I mean not statements of what we believe, but evidence of what actu-
ally is—or at least what all rational creatures similarly situated would believe if they 
could think straight. That we have good reason to believe such evidence exists is the now 
the well-defended claim of a major school of present-day moral philosophy, Cornell or 
“technical” moral realism.43 Though moral realism has its critics, its status as a leading 
school of contemporary metaethics is sufficient to impart intellectual respectability to 
socially relevant constitutional commentary of the kind that Levinson’s writings repre-
sent. By ignoring this development, Levinson straddles fences and lands in awkward 
places. Despite his criticism of value-free social science, he frames value words like 
                                                	   40.	  	   Id.	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  	  	   42.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  235.	  	   43.	  	   For	  an	  overview	  of	  moral	  realism	  tailored	  for	  legal	  scholars,	  see	  Michael	  S.	  Moore,	  Moral	  Reality,	  1982	  WIS.	  L.	  REV.	  1061	  (1982);	  Michael	  S.	  Moore,	  Moral	  Reality	  Revisited,	  90	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  2424	  (1992).	  
See	  also	  DAVID	  O.	  BRINK,	  MORAL	  REALISM	  AND	  THE	  FOUNDATION	  OF	  ETHICS	  (1989);	  RUSS	  SHAFER-­‐LANDAU,	  MORAL	  REALISM:	  A	  DEFENCE	  (2003).	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good, bad, public interest, and virtue in scare quotes throughout the book44 At one point 
he recognizes that while presidents and other administrators must have authority that the 
law cannot fully structure, this does not mean “no difference” between presidents who 
exercise discretion and “iconic twentieth-century dictators like Adolph Hitler and Josef 
Stalin.”45 Yet at another point Levinson wonders whether there is “a truly shared base-
line for determining what is ‘tyrannical’ or ‘non-tyrannical’”46 At one point in his discus-
sion of defensible compromises and “rotten . . . compromise[s]”47 he approves Lincoln’s 
refusal to compromise on slavery in the territories.48 At another point, however, he de-
fends Stephen Douglas’s criticism of Lincoln for promising that as president he would 
appoint to the Supreme Court Republicans who opposed slavery in the territories.49 
Douglas called Lincoln’s promise “a proposition to make [the Supreme Court] the cor-
rupt, unscrupulous tool of a political party.”50 Levinson further says that whatever one 
thinks of Douglas’s position on slavery, his challenge to Lincoln was “a very powerful 
one.”51 Yet the power of Douglas’s challenge is far from clear. It might have been a 
powerful challenge had slavery’s extension been a question about which judges should 
have remained neutral. But Lincoln condemned neutrality on this question; indeed, non-
neutrality on this question was the leading point of Lincoln’s political career.   
By implicitly questioning Lincoln on this point, one wonders whether Levinson be-
lieves that judges should remain neutral on any and all moral questions, a proposition no 
one can believe because of its self-contradictory nature. Lincoln believed the Republi-
cans were right about slavery not because they were Republicans, but because slavery 
was wrong—that no reflective person would govern another like himself without the 
other’s consent, and that this made slavery wrong. If judges should remain neutral on a 
given moral question just because political parties line up differently on the question, 
then it is hard to see how constitutional scholars could, in reason’s name, condemn a pol-
icy of exploiting old folks for big pharma’s benefit, not to mention other current wrongs 
like the income gap that is killing upward mobility; legalized bribery that has substituted 
oligarchic calculation for what was left of public reason; global warming that will kill 
our agriculture, our coasts, our economy, and our people – all in the silly name of “lim-
ited government,” which no one really believes in when it comes to ends that they want 
government to pursue.52 
If Levinson thinks reason counsels detachment, neutrality, or non-partisanship on 
all moral questions, then one must wonder why he wrote Framed. Despite himself, Lev-
inson appreciates this point. When he doubts that there is a “shared baseline” for distin-
                                                	   44.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  7,	  80,	  108,	  114,	  145,	  155,	  166.	  	   45.	  	   Id.	  at	  373.	  	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  326.	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  44.	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  45.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  260-­‐61.	  	   50.	  	   Id.	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  at	  261.	  	  	   52.	  	   See	  SOTIRIOS	  A.	  BARBER,	  WELFARE	  AND	  THE	  CONSTITUTION,	  106-­‐17	  (2003)	  (arguing	  that	   limited	   gov-­‐ernment	  ought	   to	  mean	  government	   limited	  chiefly	  by	  ends	   (security,	  prosperity,	  or	   comprehensively,	  the	  people’s	  welfare)	   that	  can	  be	  defended	  publically	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   common	  human	  experiences,	  not	  privileged	  “revelations”	  or	  self-­‐serving	  “interests”).	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guishing tyranny from non-tyranny, he recognizes that the (alleged) absence of such a 
baseline “raises yet other problems when trying to assess any political institutions for 
their propensity to achieve the ‘public good.’”53 Indeed. But what is Framed if not an as-
sessment of our institutions as instrumental to the public good? The “other problems 
when trying to assess any political institutions” include the philosophic status of value 
judgments.54 Since Levinson is undecided about whether value judgments have truth 
value, should he not have resolved this issue for himself before submitting Framed to his 
publisher? 
Levinson’s problem with value judgments also affects his understanding of the 
scope of constitutional reform. He clearly wants to emphasize constitutional ends and to 
assess institutional performance in terms of constitutional ends.55 At the same time, he 
conceives constitutional ends as “essentially contested concept[s],” by which he means 
terms about which “there [are] no single widely shared notion[s]” beyond the belief that 
they are “good thing[s].”56 And though he says at one point that these terms invite “end-
less debate,” he is not willing to say that they are meaningless or refer to no part of reali-
ty.57 On the contrary, he notes that “[e]veryone agrees that justice is important, and al-
most everyone in the modern world applauds the notion of democracy.”58 He also 
mentions that “millions (including some famous philosophers) believe in the reality of 
the common good or justice.”59 Combining these disparate thoughts, in a way that Levin-
son never gets around to, would support Ronald Dworkin’s account of good-faith moral 
disputation as back-and-forth testing of competing “conceptions” of general “concepts” 
in an effort to rise above initial prejudices and arrive at “right answers.”60 Or the effort 
might support a realist account of moral disputation as a dialectical attempt to substitute 
truth for opinion about the demands of justice and other goods, conceived as real goods, 
about which anyone can err.61 In either case, the disputants-in-good-faith would display a 
sense of their fallibility and a desire not to assert themselves, but to do the right thing. 
A non-skeptical concern for constitutional ends thus segues into a concern for the 
attitudes and the character of a people. As I noted at the beginning of this essay, Levin-
son himself concludes Framed with a call for what amounts to the patriotism and philan-
thropy of his readers that is identical in substance to the opening summons of The Feder-
alist.62 Yet Levinson, again like The Federalist, seems to think that the requisite attitudes 
and dispositions will simply materialize and maintain themselves as byproducts of insti-
tutional performance, not as the results of deliberate governmental efforts. Notwithstand-
ing the vaunted ends-orientation of Framed, it devotes far more space to the undemocrat-
ic characteristics of America’s governments than to the quality of their policy outputs. 
                                                	   53.	  	   	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  326.	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  	   55.	  	   Id.	  at	  8,	  14-­‐15,	  55-­‐57,	  59,	  114-­‐16,	  285,	  316,	  355-­‐57.	  	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  82.	  
	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  58.	  	   58.	  	   Id.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  93.	  	   60.	  	   RONALD	  DWORKIN,	  TAKING	  RIGHTS	  SERIOUSLY	  104-­‐05,	  134-­‐35	  (1977).	  	   61.	  	   SOTIRIOS	  A.	  BARBER,	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  POWER	  60-­‐61,	  213-­‐15	  (1993).	  	   62.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  391.	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While Framed is truly “both wider and deeper” than Our Undemocratic Constitution, 
both books are part of the same discussion.63 Both assume that a government that is more 
democratic and more efficient will do a better job of approximating constitutional ends–a 
better job of improving the lives of more Americans in ways that can earn the admiration 
of Jefferson’s “candid world.” Both books culminate in the call for a national constitu-
tional convention. Framed proposes a two-year, plenary constitutional convention to 
conduct a “comprehensive overview” of the nation’s constitution and propose needed 
reforms.64 Delegates would be selected by lottery from each state proportionate to the 
state’s population, in order to prevent a takeover of the convention by well-financed 
“single-issue zealots.”65 To make service by “the less well off” possible, delegates would 
receive the salary of a Supreme Court Justice or a U.S. senator, together with a budget to 
enable them to hold hearings “all over the United States and the world.”66  
Levinson says “probably most” readers will reject this proposal.67 This is surely the 
grandmother of all understatements. For the very convening of such a convention would 
implicitly abolish the states as what the right-wing Justices of the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts have called “separate and independent sovereigns.”68 Since there is no chance of 
Congress calling such a convention, a convention would have to be called by some pro-
cess external to Article V and paid for by some process external to congressional appro-
priations. Levinson is talking revolution here, pure and simple, which modern technolo-
gy and economic interdependency would make far less feasible and bearable than the 
revolutions of the 18th century. 
A final problem with Levinson’s position is his faith that “ordinary Americans” are 
up to the intellectual and moral exertions and the material sacrifices that wholesale con-
stitutional reform would require in an era of ungovernable technological, economic, and 
social change.69 One wonders what on earth might support this faith. What makes Levin-
son think that “ordinary Americans” care enough for their fellow citizens and their im-
pact on the world—like their impact on oil consumption and greenhouse emissions? 
What makes him think they can possibly become sufficiently informed about modern 
government and a high-tech, global economy with instant global communication, whose 
channels are open to virtually everyone with something to say, however false and de-
structive? How could Levinson possibly respond to Madison’s argument in the 49th Fed-
eralist that trusting constitutional repair to popular majorities is trusting “the spirit of pre-
existing parties” and the “passions . . . of the public” in a process that should be gov-
erned by “the reason of the public alone  ”?70  
Levinson’s faith is all the more puzzling in view of his singling out Alan Wolfe as 
the nation’s leading public intellectual.71 Given Wolfe’s assessment of the competence 
                                                	   63.	  	   Id.	  at	  396.	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  at	  391.	  	   65.	  	   Id.	  at	  391-­‐92.	  	   66.	  	   Id.	  at	  391.	  	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  392.	  	   68.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Nat’l	  Fed.	  of	  Indep.	  Bus.	  v.	  Sebelius,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  2566,	  2603	  (2012).	  	   69.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  392.	  	   70.	  	   	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  49	  (Alexander	  Hamilton),	  in	  THE	  FEDERALIST,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  342-­‐43.	  	  	   71.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  399.	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and the attitude of the American public—partly extreme, partly cynical about and indif-
ferent to politics; uninformed; easily manipulated by ruthlessly determined ideologues 
“who appeal to their vanity rather than speak to their needs”; “uneas[y] with the process 
of democracy itself”; and unlikely to “demand[] reforms that would restore their faith in 
democracy”72—one can wonder how Levinson can regard Wolfe so highly and still have 
faith that a movement of “ordinary Americans” can affect any meaningful constitutional 
reform. 
Levinson thus leaves the reader with questions about his understanding of the Con-
stitution as a whole, his view of the meaningfulness of constitutional values, how his re-
form proposal might get off the ground, and his faith in the American people. He also 
leaves the reader with a sense that Framed is something of a career-culminating magnum 
opus. Constitutionalists everywhere should hope that this is not so.	  
                                                	   72.	  	   WOLFE,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  24-­‐49.	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